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On May 17, 2010, a five-justice majority of the Supreme
Court held in Graham v. Florida1 that the Eighth Amendment bars imposition of life in prison without the possibility
of release (LIPWPR) for nonhomicide crimes if the perpetrator was under the age of 18 at the time of his offense.
In an opinion penned by Justice Kennedy, the Court held
that this prohibition is categorical and reflects the simple
fact that LIPWPR is objectively disproportionate2 when
applied to juveniles whose offenses do not result in
death.
Graham rests squarely on foundations Justice Kennedy
laid in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). In Roper, the
Court found that juveniles in general are incapable of
forming the mental connections to their crimes necessary
to justify imposing the most severe punishment their
crimes might otherwise warrant. Roper therefore held that,
although the death penalty is constitutionally available for
homicide, when juveniles kill, the Eighth Amendment
entitles them to a discount to at most LIPWPR.
Relying on the same finding of generally reduced culpability, the Court in Graham held that when juveniles
commit nonhomicide crimes that warrant permanent
incarceration, the Eighth Amendment entitles them to a
discount from LIPWPR to at most life in prison with the
meaningful possibility of release. As he did in Roper, in
Graham Justice Kennedy cited international and comparative law sources to confirm the Court’s “independent
judgment.”3
Justice Thomas, writing for Justice Scalia, Justice Alito,
and himself, dissented both from the holding and from
the Court’s reliance on contemporary sources of international and comparative law. In his dissent, Justice Thomas
expressed a quite understandable preference for democratic resolution of disputed issues of public policy,
morality, and ethics. Strumming notes familiar from
counter majoritarian debates in the academy and contests
over judicial activism in Congress and civil society, Justice
Thomas lamented the majority’s substitution of judgments on proportionate punishment held by appointed
justices for those reached among the elected branches.
Although critics may argue that Justice Thomas and
his fellow dissenters do not have clean hands on these
matters,4 Justice Thomas’s basic point is well-taken. As a

matter of interbranch authority, political legitimacy, and
institutional competence, judges are surely not in the best
position to design, articulate, and implement sentencing
policy. Moreover, interests in the Court’s own legitimacy
and systemic stability urge justices to bind their constitutional decisions to some fixed point rather than allowing
the five justices who find themselves in the majority on
any particular issue on any particular day to indulge their
idiosyncratic views.
Although we do not endorse the categorical rule
announced by the Court in Graham, we nevertheless find
most of the dissent’s objections to be misplaced. In our
view, originalists such as Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia should recognize that the Eighth Amendment imposes
objective moral restraints on criminal punishment, that
by constitutional design the Court is entrusted with the
authority and responsibility to identify and enforce those
restraints, and that the epistemic challenge left to the
Court in Eighth Amendment cases urges a “decent respect
[for] the opinions of mankind”5 as part of a broader effort
to reach the best understanding possible of what punishments are actually cruel and unusual.
Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia have long held the
view that members of the Court can best meet demands
for stability and legitimacy by binding their opinions to
the original public meaning of the text.6 In Eighth Amendment cases, this approach usually means searching the
record for punishments in common use in 1792. In Graham, Justice Thomas cited evidence that in 1792 the death
penalty was available in a majority of states for nonviolent
crimes we might now consider rather petty, even if perpetrated by those we now regard as juveniles. Based on that
evidence, he concludes that there is no Eighth Amendment bar on LIPWPR for juveniles because few if any of
those who lived in the United States in 1792 would have
regarded LIPWPR as cruel or unusual regardless of
whether the offender happens to be 17, and particularly
for violent nonhomicide crimes.7
The problem with this conclusion is that it does not
necessarily follow from originalist premises. The Constitution is an inherently aspirational document, designed to
“form a more perfect Union,” to “establish Justice,” to
ensure “Tranquility,” to “promote the general Welfare,”
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and to “secure the blessings of Liberty.”8 Late-eighteenthcentury Americans were moral realists and believers in
the natural law for whom these aspirations were attached
to fixed goals in the form of objective moral truths.9
Although much of the Constitution is devoted to architectural or utilitarian tasks, at several crucial points the
Framers referenced objective moral constraints. Among
these constraints is the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishment. Read for its original
public meaning, that phrase excludes from public policy
punishments that are cruel and unusual. Those who lived
in the United States in 1792 surely had views on such matters. However, if the originalists’ commitment to read the
text for its original public meaning is taken seriously, then
it would be a mistake to promote their views to the status
of objective truth.10 At best, investigating their views
might show what the drafters of the text intended to prohibit. However, for originalists, original meaning, not
original intent, is the proper object of judicial inquiry.11
Regardless of their personal views on moral matters,
be they Platonists or Rortian ironists, judges who read the
Constitution for its original public meaning are committed
to the view that the Eighth Amendment, read for its original
public meaning, requires them to declare unconstitutional
punishments that are cruel and unusual. That is no easy
task, but it is the Court’s burden to bear. Within the broad
field of contested issues of morality, ethics, and policy, the
vast majority of questions are left to the political branches.
However, in a very few instances, the Constitution removes
these deep questions from the compass of the legislature
and rests them with the judiciary. Regardless of how strong
public support might be, legislators and executives may
not sanction cruel and unusual punishment. If and when
they do, it is the Court’s institutional responsibility and
constitutional duty to declare the offending laws or policies
unconstitutional. Declining to do so out of democratic
humility, although respectable in the abstract, is an abdication that compromises constitutional design.
This state of affairs leaves originalists such as Justice
Thomas and Justice Scalia with an epistemic problem in
Eighth Amendment cases such as Graham. How are they
to know whether a punishment is cruel and unusual?
Senate confirmation does not bring with it the chalice of
enlightenment, so modesty surely is called for. Justice
Thomas is therefore quite right to express concerns with
Justice Kennedy’s conclusion that the Court must determine in the exercise of its own “independent judgment”
whether the punishment in question violates the Constitution.12 After all, that assertion seems to bind the Eighth
Amendment not to timeless moral truths, but to the idiosyncratic views of five justices. But is there an epistemic
method the Court can apply that would provide some
assurance that the justices are doing more than giving
constitutional dimension to their personal views? We
think there is, and believe that this method endorses the
Court’s references to international and comparative law
in Eighth Amendment cases.

The primary epistemic method endorsed by the Court
in Eighth Amendment cases is contained in Chief Justice
Warren’s oft-repeated phrase, “The [Eighth] Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”13
However, as Justice Scalia has pointed out, evolution may
sometimes mark decay rather than maturation.14 How,
then, is the Court to know that an emerging consensus
constitutes progress? The project of discourse ethics,
advanced most famously in the work of German philosopher Jürgen Habermas,15 suggests a promising criterion.
The fundamental insight of discourse ethics is that the
best answers to normative questions result from conversations among all interested parties who engage one another
under ideal conditions. These ideal conditions are characterized by the participants’ willingness to offer and
consider reasons in the absence of threats of force and to
discard, adjust, and adopt views based on the best reasons,
all in the hope of reaching consensus.
Measured by this standard, there are very good reasons to be skeptical of views on cruelty in the public
record from 1792 America. After all, a substantial majority of those who had legitimate interests in questions of
cruelty were excluded from the conversation. U.S. society
has since made considerable progress on this score by
including more and more people in the conversation, by
removing barriers on participation, and by slowly giving
equal consideration to new participants’ interests and reasons. From a discourse point of view, then, there is good
reason to believe that a contemporary consensus on what
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment does indeed
mark a positive evolution that comes closer to truth than
views held by a profoundly racist and patriarchal society.
A discourse method also endorses consulting some
international and comparative law sources. After all, we in
the United States are not alone in our efforts to avoid cruelty. Quite to the contrary, that commitment is foundational
for many nations and is central to the international human
rights culture. To the extent that consensus views held by
foreign nations or the international community reflect full,
fair, and inclusive discursive processes, there seems little
reason for the Court not to consider them.16
As Justice Kennedy points out, the results of international and transnational conversations provide considerable
evidence of a consensus view that LIPWPR for juveniles
cannot be justified. Only eleven nations authorize life
without parole for juvenile offenders; only two of them,
the United States and Israel, actually use the punishment.
Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child, which has been ratified by every country on
Earth except for the United States and Somalia, states that
“capital punishment” and “life imprisonment without the
possibility of release” are prohibited for juveniles under 18
years of age.17 Although this international consensus is
not entirely free from procedural defects, the record is
pretty good, and certainly “demonstrates that the Court’s
rationale has respected reasoning to support it.”18
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Of course, this analysis is far too quick to be fully persuasive. We hope, however, that in this short essay we
have been able to provide a bit more depth and credibility
both for the Court’s decision in Graham to embrace the
epistemic challenge posed in Eighth Amendment cases
and for its method. In our view, that method rightly
includes modest appeals to and a decent respect for those
international and comparative law sources that report the
results of a more inclusive conversation among those
with legitimate interests in fundamental questions of
cruelty.
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130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). Graham was charged with armed
burglary and attempted armed robbery for acts perpetrated
when he was 16. Expressing considerable regret and the
intention to change his life, Graham pleaded guilty in
exchange for three years’ probation. During his probationary
period, Graham participated in a series of armed home invasion robberies. A judge new to Graham’s case found Graham
guilty of violating the terms of his parole. The prosecutor
requested a sentence of thirty to forty-five years’ imprisonment. Graham’s attorney requested five years. A presentence
report issued by the Florida Department of Corrections recommended four years. Finding that Graham had elected a life
of crime that rendered him unsuitable for release, the judge
sentenced Graham to life, which, in the Florida system, is a
determinate sentence without the possibility of early release
absent executive clemency.
Objectively disproportionate means that LIPWPR is too
severe when imposed on juveniles for nonhomicide crimes
regardless of what punishments are imposed for more
serious crimes. We use the phrase here in contrast with
comparative proportionality, which would be concerned with
how severe the punishments inflicted for nonhomicide
crimes are compared with punishments inflicted for homicide crimes.
130 S. Ct. at 2033–34.
Most recently, critics have pointed to the Court’s decision in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 50
(2010), as an example of conservative activism that violates
principles of judicial restraint.
The Declaration of Independence ¶ 1 (U.S. 1776), reprinted in
1 U.S.C. at xliii (2000). Although some argue that this phrase
from the Declaration of Independence makes international
and comparative law sources relevant to most if not all cases
decided by domestic courts, we do not.
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Although Justice Alito’s public record is not as well established, his vote in Graham at least indicates sympathy for this
version of originalism.
In support of this point, Justice Thomas referred to Chief
Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion, which recounted the
case of a 17-year-old who “beat and raped an 8-year-old girl
before leaving her to die under 197 pounds of rock in a recycling bin in a remote landfill,” and the case of two juveniles
who “gang raped a woman and forced her to perform oral sex
on her 12-year-old son.” 130 S. Ct. at 2041 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
U.S. Const. pmbl.
See Antonin Scalia, Reply, in A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 146 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); David
C. Gray, Why Justice Scalia Should Be a Constitutional Comparativist…Sometimes, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1249, 1262 (2007).
This assertion assumes that those who read and wrote the
Eighth Amendment in 1792 did not hold a theory of semantics by which historical or contemporary use of abstract
moral terms fixes their meanings. Although various forms of
this view were in circulation in 1792 and are quite common
today, our countrymen of 1792 appear to have been more
inclined to the view that deific law or the law of nature provided a stable referent for such words as justice and cruel.
Gray, supra note 9, at 1265. See also Scalia, supra note 9,
at 3 (explaining that he consults the Framers’ views when
interpreting the Constitution “not because . . . their intent is
authoritative . . . but rather because their writings . . . display
how the text of the Constitution was originally understood.”).
Graham, supra note 1 at 10 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
Scalia, supra note 8, at 40–41 (“A society that adopts a bill
of rights is skeptical that ‘evolving standards of decency’
always ‘mark progress,’ and that societies always ‘mature,’
as opposed to rot.”).
See, e.g., Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action 43–115 (1990).
Cf. United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995)
(Calabresi, J., concurring) (“Wise parents . . . do not hesitate
to learn from their children.”).
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, art.
37(a), U.N. Doc. A/44/736, 28 I.L.M. 1456 (Nov. 20, 1989).
Cf. Rome Statute, art. 26, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (Jan. 16,
2002) (“The Court shall have no jurisdiction over any person
who was under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged commission of a crime.”). But see Mark Drumbl, Not So Simple:
Child Soldiers, Justice, and the International Legal Imagination
(forthcoming 2011) (arguing against categorical conceptions
of juvenile culpability for war crimes).
130 S. Ct. at 2034.
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